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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellant Dan Trease ("beaM*' I lili il hr |>ntitinn Im re, HM/1 I lllllit final ordei 
of the Department of Environmental Quality's Solid and Hazardous Waste Control 
Board ("Board") after a formal adjudicative proceeding. "I his l o u d has junsdiLin. -i 
over Hi- poti lh' i ' I \ - "" - ' " "hi" ,.,!( A,- , § 63-46b-16 (1991) and § 78 2a 
3(2)(a) (Supp. 1994). 
ISSUES PRESENTED/STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1 . Did the Executive Secretary of the Department of Environmental 
Quality, Division of Environmental Response and Remediation ("DbRR or 
"Division") abuse hr", tiis* imion iii i l fU' i i i i ini ini I I M I iiinii'i Ihe Utah Administrative 
Code R311-210-3 (d), Trease's failure to contest the Notice of Violation and Order 
within 30 days waved his right to administrative contest, reuinsirloMiion i* i/it, v or 
judicial appi - yiew is abuse of discretion. A decision to grant 
or deny a Rule 601 motion should not be reversed absent abuse of discretion See 
Fackrell v. Fackrell. , 4 ' I ' . ' - l I JIT'""( I ', ' I " I . i l i I ( ^ ' , |, Lurbctt i/. t itzgeruld. 709 
P.2d 384, 386 (Utah 1985); 
2. Did the Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board abuse its dis it?liun 
iii ii(.litj|fliiH t l i r F -f " h i , , , Sec ii i .ii y's denial of Trease's Rule 60 Motion to Set 
Aside Order? The standard of review is abuse of discretion. A decision to grant or 
deny a Rule 60 motion should not be reversed rtb;t nt » Iniso nil (iisciii l inii ;iVe 
Fackiell v. Fackrell. 740 P.2d 1318, 1320 (Utah 1987); Corbett v. Fitzgerald. 709 
1. Utah R. C Rules 60 (b)(7). 
P.2d 384, 386 (Utah 1985). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-401 et seq., Utah Underground Storage 
Tank Act. 
2. Utah Admin. Code, Rule R311-210 et seq.. Administrative Procedures 
for Underground Storage Tank Act Adjudicative Proceedings. 
(Attached as Addendum A). 
3. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60 (b). (Attached as Addendum B). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This case arises under the Utah Underground Storage Tank Act ("Act") , 
Utah Code Annotated ("UCA") section 19-6-401, £t sm and the Utah Admin. Code 
("UAC"), R 311-210, et seq.. ("Rules") Administrative Procedures for Underground 
Storage Tank Act Adjudicative Proceedings. It involves the Executive Secretary's 
determination that Trease waved his right to administrative contest, 
reconsideration, review or judicial appeal by failing to contest the Notice of 
Violation and Order ("Notice and Order") within 30 days after the date issued as 
required under UAC R311-210-3 (d). 
In accordance wi th Utah Admin. Code R311-210-3 (d), all initial Orders or 
Notices of Violation are effective upon issuance and become final if they are not 
contested within 30 days of the date issued. Thus, the party waves any right to 
2 
administrative or judicial reviev\ The contesting party has the burden of proving 
that tf le Notice and Order was 
311-210-3 Id). 
A party may seek to have the Executive Secretary set aside an inn 
and Uuk-jr b,," h Ik.i ,iii.{ ll ^oroiinu \ iinilinr.'l in the Utal i Rules ut Civil Procedure, 
Rule 60. If suet\ a motion to set aside is denied, the party may seek 
reconsideration K the agency or Boaid ol MMI ik'i.r mn i null, lll(.iil) Ailnnn i uilr H 
3 1 1 n i r . 1 |. 
B. Course of the Proceedings and Statement of Facts. 
[
 : - ICK Tank (UST) 
facilities, numerous USTs and also delivers petroleum to his facilities and USTs. 
Record " ' n "v 1 85-186. DERR has been working wi 
I smut; i vo\~. on v/uiio *1, i j 9 i , u.d Executive 
Secretary sent a certified letter to Trease that resembled numerous other letters 
designed to assist Trease lh j t k m . ( •np'M'ir.t1 . u 1 Ik1
 }vdii l ||(1111 | h c ki t* i 
asked Trease to submit petroleum delivery and inventory records to DERR within 1 5 
days. Id. Like most of the other letters, the last paragraph he letter states I 
i, Li< i .1
 (| i-iR'sl in , iilertsr uinkiPt [name of a DERR employee] at 536-4100 . " 
M . In October, 1993, William (Bill) Moore was the DERR employee designated to 
work with Trease to assist him ' 
problems at his facilities, wi th his USTs and wi th his petroleum deliveries. R. 0 4 1 , 
Mi Moore met with, spoke to and otherwise communicated wi th Trease many 
3 
times regarding the facility concerned in this matter ("Hooper facility") and Trease's 
other facilities. R. 0 4 1 , 1 6 1 . 
On February 6, 1995, a Notice and Order was filed by the Executive 
Secretary, In the Matter of Dan Trease, 5600 South 5900 West, Hooper, Utah, Re: 
Facility ID No. 1200241 . R. 005 . The Notice and Order alleges that Trease had 
made 69 petroleum deliveries to the Hooper facility, which he owns and which was 
not in compliance, i d . This is a violation of § 19-6-416 (1) of the Act because 
Trease had never obtained a certificate of compliance for the facility as required. id-
and Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-412 (1) (b). The Notice and Order which assesses a 
$29,500 penalty, was attached to a certified letter to Trease informing him that the 
Notice and Order was enclosed. R. 149. The last paragraph of the letter states "If 
you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact William Moore at 536-
4 1 2 1 . " I d . 
In accordance wi th Utah Code Ann § 19-6-404(3) and Utah Administrative 
Code, R 311-210-4, Trease had 30 days to file a writ ten request for agency action 
contesting the Notice and Order. This fact was stated on the last page of the 
Notice and Order as fol lows: 
Order 
In accordance wi th Utah Code Ann. §19-6-416(2) the 
Executive Secretary hereby assesses you a penalty of twenty nine 
thousand five hundred dollars ($29,500.00), for 59 of the 69 
violations set forth in paragraph 13 above, and Orders you to submit 
the penalty within 30 days. 
Pursuant to 19-6-404(3), you may contest this Notice of 
Violation and Order by filing a writ ten request for Agency Action to 
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contest the Notice of Violation for it within 30 days after issuance. 
The Request for Agency Action should be filed with.... If you do not 
contest this Notice of Violation and Order as described above, the 
facts specified herein will be deemed true and not subject to contest in 
future administrative or judicial proceedings, and you will forfeit any 
right to proceed with an administrative or judicial appeal. 
The Executive Secretary intends to seek the maximum civil 
penalties for each of the other violations stated above. 
R. 003. 
Trease did not file a written response within 30 days. At some time after 
the Notice and Order was issued, Trease contacted Bill Moore and scheduled a 
meeting to discuss compliance issues at all of Trease's facilities. R. 040. The 
meeting was set for March 10, 1995 but Trease canceled the meeting and 
rescheduled, id- On March 22, 1995, Trease and Moore met and discussed the 
compliance violations at all of the Trease facilities. R. 039. Trease did not mention 
the February 6, 1995 Notice and Order to Moore nor indicate either directly or 
indirectly that the meeting was intended to contest the Notice and Order, id. 
On March 6, 1995, as specified in Utah Admin. Code R311-210-3(d) and 
stated in the Order, the Order became final 30 days after it was issued. R. 003. 
On April 6, 1995 DERR received Trease's Response to Notice Of Violations and 
Order. R. 009. In a letter dated April 2 1 , 1995, the Executive Secretary informed 
Trease that the Order had already become final and suggested that he could file a 
Motion to Set Aside the Order in accordance with Utah Admin. Code R311-210-3 
(e). R. 011 . 
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On May 9, 1995, Trease filed a Motion to set Aside Order and Memorandum 
of Authorities in Support of Motion to Set Aside Order. R. 035. The basis for this 
Motion was Trease's claim that his failure to respond was excusable neglect and 
that he had a meritorious defense in that he had relied upon statements of DERR 
employees in continuing to deliver petroleum to the facility although he did not have 
the statutorily required certificate of compliance. R.035. The Executive Secretary 
denied the Motion to Set Aside on November 20, 1995. R. 053 . The Order 
denying the Motion found that Trease's failure to timely contest the Order was not 
due to mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect as required under Utah 
R. Civ. P., Rule 60 (b)(1) and that his claims of equitable estoppel had not 
presented a meritorious defense against the order as required under R. 60 (b)(1). R. 
0 5 3 . 
On December 15, 1995 Trease appealed the decision of the Executive 
Secretary to the Board under the provisions of R311-210-3(e)(2) which states "the 
party may seek reconsideration or agency review of only that decision to deny such 
motion to set aside the order or notice." R. 066 . In his Memorandum in Support of 
the Motion for Agency Review, Trease argued that the Executive Secretary abused 
his discretion in denying the Motion to Set Aside and further asserted that his 
claims of equitable estoppel had presented a meritorious defense. R. 066 . 
The Division filed a Motion to Dismiss on March 28, 1996. R. 167. The 
Memorandum in Support of the Motion asserted that the Executive Secretary's 
denial of the Motion to Set Aside was not arbitrary, capricious or not based on 
6 
adequate findings of fact or on the law. R. 163. Trease responded to the 
Division's Motion to Dismiss on April 15, 1996, asserting that the Executive 
Secretary's denial was an abuse of discretion. R. 174. He alleged that the 
Executive Secretary had expressed a dislike for Trease and that the Division had not 
followed the provisions of "R3-11-2102 (f)(sic)" by not providing a copy of the 
Notice and Order to counsel for Trease. R. 171-172. Utah Admin. Code R311-
210-2 (f) states that "[wjhenever a party is known to be represented by an 
attorney...service...shall be made upon the attorney... A party is known to be 
represented by an attorney at the time the attorney files a notice of appearance of 
counsel, request for agency action, or any other paper which the attorney signs on 
behalf of a party." The Division asserted that current counsel for Trease had 
specifically stated that he did not represent Respondent in this matter. R. 183-
184. 
The Board met on May 9, 1996, to consider Trease's Motion for Agency 
Review of Order Denying Motion to Set Aside Notice and Order and the Division's 
Motion to Dismiss, denied Trease's Motion for Agency Review of Order Denying 
Motion to Set Aside Notice and Order and affirmed the Executive Secretary's Order 
dated November 20, 1995. R. 196-198. The Board granted the Division's Motion 
to Dismiss thus dismissing Trease's Motion for Agency Review and his Response to 
the Notice and Order filed April 6, 1995. R. 200. Finally the Board found that the 
Notice and Order is final and enforceable. R. 200. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Trease does not dispute the fact that if he wished to challenge the Notice 
and Order, under the Act and the Rules he was required to request agency action, 
in writ ing, within 30 days of issuance of the Notice and Order. The primary issue 
before this Court is whether the Executive Secretary abused his discretion in 
denying Trease's Motion to Set Aside Order after Trease defaulted, and whether 
the Board abused its discretion in upholding the denial of Trease's Motion by the 
Executive Secretary. A decision which constitutes abuse of discretion must be 
proven by the appellant to be arbitrary, capricious, or not based on adequate 
findings of fact or on the law. Pacer Sport Cycle, Inc. v. Myers. 534 P.2d 61 6, 
617 (Utah 1 975). Trease has not shown that denial of the Motion to Set Aside 
exceeds the limits of reasonability. The facts of the case demonstrate that the 
Executive Secretary's and the Board's decision were carefully thought out, well 
reasoned and firmly based in fact and law. 
Trease's claim that he was denied his chance to present a defense is belied 
by his own Memorandum in Support of Motion to Set Aside in which he actually 
does present his defense. Further that defense was carefully considered at length 
by the Executive Secretary as demonstrated in the Order Denying Motion to Set 
Aside. Finally, Trease claims that the letter accompanying the Notice and Order 
somehow caused the Order and instructions on how to contact the agency and 
request agency review to become "vague." This is meaningless and not a basis for 
overturning the decision of the Executive Secretary of the Board. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. TREASE HAS NOT MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT HIS 
CLAIM THAT DENIAL OF THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE WAS AN ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION 
The burden of marshaling the evidence and submitting it to the Appellate 
Court is the same in formal administrative hearings as in civil cases. "[Appellant] 
bears the burden of marshaling all of the evidence supporting the findings and then, 
despite the supporting facts, showing that the findings are not supported by 
substantial evidence." Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 858 P.2d 
1 3 8 1 , 1385 (Utah 1993). 
Our insistence on compliance wi th the marshaling requirement is not a 
case of exalting hypertechnical adherence to form over substance. "A 
reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined wi th 
pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository 
in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and 
research." 
State v. Larsen. 828 P.2d 487 , 491 (Utah App. 1992) (affirmed 865 P.2d 1355 
(Ut. 1993))(citations omitted). 
The party challenging the administrative agency's findings of fact must 
marshall all of the evidence in support of the agency findings and then demonstrate 
that the challenged findings are unsupported by substantial evidence. Steele v. Bd. 
of Rev, of Indus. Com'n. 845 P.2d 960, 962 (Utah App. 1993), citing Stewart v. 
Board of Review. 831 P.2d 134, 137-38 (Utah App. 1992). 
Trease only argues selected evidence which is favorable to his position 
without presenting any evidence supporting the agency's findings. "It is the 
petitioner's duty to properly present the record, by marshaling all of the evidence 
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supporting the findings and showing that, despite that evidence and all reasonable 
inferences that can be drawn therefrom, the findings are not supported by 
substantial evidence." Dept. of Air Force v. Swider. 824 P.2d 448 , 451 (Utah 
App. 1991), citing Grace Drilling Co. . Board of Review. 776 P.2d 63, 67 (Utah 
App. 1989); see also, Heinecke v. Dept. of Commerce. 810 P.2d 459, 464 (Utah 
App. 1991); Sampson v. Richins. 770 P.2d 998, 1002 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 
776 P.2d 916 (Utah 1989). 
Trease has not met the burden of marshaling the evidence in support of the 
administrative agency's findings or showing how those finding are not supported by 
substantial evidence. Therefore, thus Court should affirm the findings of the 
Agency. 
II. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY'S DENIAL OF TREASE'S MOTION TO SET 
ASIDE THE DEFAULT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
The standard of review that the Court must employ in determining whether 
the denial of the motion to set aside the default is whether the denial was an abuse 
of the Executive Secretary's discretion. A decision to grant or deny a Utah R. Civ. 
P. Rule 60 motion should not be reversed absent abuse of discretion. See Fackrell 
v. Fackrell. 740 P.2d 1318, 1320 (Utah 1987); Corbett v. Fitzgerald. 709 P.2d 
384, 386 (Utah 1985); Larsen v. Collin. 684 P. 2d 52, 54 (Utah 1984); Birch v. 
Birch. 771 P.2d 1114, 1117 (Utah App. 1989): Baker v. Western Surety Co.. 757 
P.2d 878, 881 (Utah App. 1988). In Pacer Sport Cycle. Inc. v. Myers, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that a court "should not reverse [a decision granting or denying 
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a Rule 60(b) motion] except for abuse of discretion, to wi t , that it is arbitrary, 
capricious, or not based on adequate findings of fact or on the l aw / ' Pacer, 534 
P.2d 616, 617 (Utah 1975). Unless this Court finds that the Executive 
Secretary's decision is arbitrary, capricious, or not based on adequate findings of 
fact or on the law, it must uphold the decision of the Executive Secretary. 
Trease claims that his conduct was a reasonable mistake and that the default 
should have been set aside because "he merely responded in the incorrect manner 
by scheduling a meeting." Appellant's Brief at 7. However, the Notice and Order 
sent to Trease did not state that he should set up a meeting, nor did the attached 
letter suggest that a meeting would waive the requirements specifically set out in 
the Order. R. 002 . As wi th the many similar letters previously sent to Trease, the 
attached letter suggested that if Trease had any questions he should call a DERR 
employee. R. 0 0 1 , 149. On the other hand, the Order clearly, specifically and in 
detail stated that, in accordance wi th the applicable statutes, the respondent must 
respond in writing within 30 days, or the Notice and Order would be deemed to be 
true and all rights to contest the matter would be forfeited. R. 002 . Neither the 
letter nor the attached Notice and Order provided any reason for Trease to assume 
that setting up a meeting would waive the need to reply. The Order was very 
specific in putting Trease on notice that he was required to reply in writ ing to a 
specific address. Further, since he had received other letters similar to the attached 
letter, he should have been able to differentiate the Notice and Order from the 
letter. 
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Trease presents himself as an innocent citizen unaware of the administrative 
system or judicial system who made an excusable mistake. This pose is fallacious 
in light of the facts. Appellant has had lengthy experience in the administrative 
forum. Trease owns and/or operates several UST facilities, numerous USTs and 
also delivers petroleum. R. 185-186. DERR employees have been working wi th 
Trease in an attempt to bring his facilities into compliance since 1990. id . Over 
that time Trease has repeatedly attempted to avoid compliance, has ignored the 
Act, has refused to follow specific requests and orders and has demonstrated his 
unwillingness to comply wi th applicable laws and rules. R. 073 , 162, 175, 178, 
185. Trease has previously defaulted in administrative cases and had a District 
Court Judgment issued against him in a case in which he defaulted. 2 He has had 
his certificates of compliance revoked by default at several stations. 3 id . 
Despite the revocations, Trease has continued to deliver petroleum to the facilities, 
id. 
2. On December 4, 1 9 9 1 , a Judgment and Order was issued against Trease in Second District 
Court case No. 910902892 . A default judgment had been entered against Trease in this 
matter when he failed to respond to a Notice of Violation and Order. 
3. Notice of Non-compliance, Facility # 3000188 , issued February 3, 1992; 
Notice of Intent to Revoke Certificate of Compliance, Facility ID # 3000188 , issued October 
28, 1992; 
Order Revoking Certificate of Compliance, Facility ID # 3000188 , November 30, 1994. 
Notice of Intent to Revoke Certificate of Compliance, Facility ID # 0100319 , issued August 
25, 1993. 
Notice of Intent to Revoke Certificate of Compliance, Facility ID # 1200240 , issued January 
5, 1995. 
Notice of Intent to Revoke Certificate of Compliance, Facility ID # 1 2 0 0 3 3 1 , issued January 
3 1 , 1995. 
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Trease claims that he was "under the mistaken impression that contacting a 
representative of the DERR would satisfy the requirement of responding to the 
Notice of Violations and Order within 30 days." Appellant's brief at 6. This claim 
ignores several relevant facts: (1) the notice states that a writ ten request for 
hearing is necessary and also provides the address at which to respond (R.003); (2) 
Trease had previously been defaulted in other cases for failing to respond (R. 185); 
(3) Trease had met wi th Moore on numerous previous occasions to discuss 
compliance (R. 041); (4) the meeting wi th Moore was not held until after the 
writ ten response was due ( R. 40); (4) if Trease thought that "contacting a 
representative of the DERR would satisfy the requirements of responding to Notice 
of Violations and Order within 30 days," this means that he was aware of the 
requirement (Appellant's brief at 6); and finally (5) Trease did not discuss the 
Notice and Order wi th Moore or tell him that he had scheduled the meeting in lieu 
of a written response in either of his calls to Moore or during the March 22. 1 995 
meeting. R. 039-40. 
Trease also claims that his neglect is excusable since he did not have the 
advice of an attorney.4 Appellant's Brief at 7. However, Utah courts have often 
held that the fact that a party is acting without counsel is not a ground for 
excusable neglect. See Fackrell v. Fackrell. 740 P.2d 1318, 1320 (Utah 1987), *L 
P. W. Enterprises, lpgr yT |Mwf, 604 P.2d 486 (Utah 1979), Kanzee v. Kanzee. 668 
4. Actually he had several attorneys; he simply chose not to consult them. R. 183-
184. 
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P.2d 495, 497 (Utah 1983) and Larsen v. Collin. 684 P.2d 52, 54-55 (Utah 1984). 
Trease's failure to respond to the Notice and Order is not an isolated, excusable 
mistake. Trease has displayed a pattern of conduct that demonstrates his complete 
destain for any form of regulation and his desire to flout the statutes and rules. R. 
073, 162, 175, 178, Transcript at 9, 14, 15. 
The Executive Secretary was not arbitrary or capricious in his decision to 
deny Trease's claims of reasonable mistake or excusable neglect. R. 034-053. He 
carefully and thoroughly reviewed all of the issues presented by Trease. The 
Secretary cited Mini Spas, Inc. v. Industrial Commission of Utah. 733 P.2d 130, 
132 (Utah 1987) as stating that "excusable neglect" is defined as "the exercise of 
'due diligence' by a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstance." R. 
050. 
As stated above, Trease claimed that it was his belief that meeting wi th 
Moore would toll his need to respond to the Notice and Order. However, the 
Executive Secretary, in responding to Trease's claim, outlined the various factors 
he reviewed in reaching his determination that Trease's claims did not meet the 
Mini Spas standard: (1) Trease's claim that he thought his contact wi th Moore 
would toll the time period implies that Trease was aware of the deadline; (2) the 
Notice and Order was clear and unambiguous in setting out the deadline while the 
reference to Moore in the Secretary's letter was a general statement; (3) there is 
no claim or proof that the call to Moore was made before the deadline; (4) at the 
March meeting wi th Moore, Trease did not mention the Notice and Order or imply 
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that the meeting was intended to contest the Notice and Order. R. 049. Based 
upon these factors the Secretary held that Trease's actions did not demonstrate the 
exercise of due diligence by a reasonably prudent person. Thus, the Executive 
Secretary's decision did not constitute "abuse of discretion" but was firmly based 
in sound reasoning. 
The Executive Secretary's denial of the Motion to Set Aside was not 
arbitrary, capricious or not based on adequate findings of fact or on the law. Nor 
was the Board's upholding of the decision of the Executive Secretary an abuse of 
discretion. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that a "trial court is endowed with 
considerable latitude of discretion in granting or denying a motion to relieve a party 
from a final judgment under Rule 60 (b)(1), U.R.C.P., and this court will reverse the 
trial court only where an abuse of discretion is clearly established." Airkem 
Intermountain. Inc. v. Parker. 513 P.2d 429, 431 (Utah 1973) (emphasis added). 
In the Airkem case defense counsel filed a notice of withdrawal the day of the trial 
and neither counsel nor the defendant appeared. The trial proceeded without them 
and the Court found in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant filed a motion to 
vacate alleging that his failure to appear was excusable neglect because he worked 
from 7:30 a.m. to 6:30 p.m, and his counsel had been unable to contact him. 
Further, counsel had been unable to contact the defendant's wife at home because 
she was in the hospital, terminally ill wi th cancer. The trial court denied the motion 
to vacate. The Supreme Court, in upholding the decision of the lower court, held 
that: 
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[T]he requirements of public policy demand more than a 
mere statement that a person did not have his day in court 
when full opportunity for a fair hearing was afforded to him 
or his legal representative. The movant must show that 
he has used due diligence and that he was prevented from 
appearing by circumstance over which he had no control. 
id- (Emphasis by the court). 
In the Airkem case the defendant knew that a trial would most likely be set 
in the fall and that he worked irregular hours, yet he failed to contact his counsel 
for several months. Airkem at 4 3 1 . Because of these facts, the court held that he 
had not shown due diligence and that his conduct was not excusable neglect. Id,. 
The Court upheld the lower court's denial of relief from the final judgment. M- In 
the case at hand, Trease had clear notice and prior knowledge of the process yet he 
still chose to ignore the Notice and Order. He showed no diligence whatsoever and 
his request that this Court reverse the decision of the Executive Secretary and the 
Board should be denied. 
III. THE MERITS OF TREASE'S CASE WERE CONSIDERED AND WERE FOUND 
TO NOT SATISFY UTAH'S MERITORIOUS DEFENSE REQUIREMENT FOR 
SETTING ASIDE A DEFAULT JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 60(b)(1). 
Prior to issuing the Order denying the Motion to Set Aside Order, the 
Executive Secretary looked carefully at the defenses presented by Trease. R. 043-
053. Trease claims that it is "harsh and unreasonable punishment" that he should 
have to pay penalties "without having the merits of the case considered." 
Appellant's Brief at 7. However, Trease submitted a lengthy Memorandum and 
several affidavits which were considered by the Executive Secretary in reaching his 
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decision. R. 012-33. In fact the greater half of the Executive Secretary's Order 
was dedicated to discussing Trease's defenses. R. 044-048. The Executive 
Secretary's denial of the Motion to Set Aside was not an ill-advised or quickly made 
decision; rather, the Executive Secretary carefully considered all of the aspects of 
Trease's defense in reaching his decision. See, Order Denying Motion to Set Aside 
and attached affidavits, R. 036-053. 
Trease's "meritorious defense" is his claim that he "reasonably relied" on 
statements allegedly made by a DERR employee, Shelly Quick, in continuing to 
deliver petroleum when he had no certificate of compliance. R. 028. However, in 
his Order the Executive Secretary noted that (1) a letter from the Executive 
Secretary had informed Trease that he was not to receive fuel at that facility (R. 
047); (2) an affidavit from Ms. Quick refuted Trease's claims concerning her alleged 
statements (id-); (3) even if Ms. Quick had made the statements, her statements 
would not supersede the Order of the Executive Secretary or the Act (R. 046-
047); and (4) Trease's claims did not meet the elements necessary to invoke 
equitable estoppel. R. 047. 
Trease actually did have his chance to present his defense, but even if he 
5. "The equitable doctrine of estoppel had three factual predicates: '(1) an admission, 
statement, or act inconsistent with the claim afterward asserted, (2) action by the other party on 
the faith of such admission, statement, or act, and (3) injury to such other party resulting from 
allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such admission, statement, or act.'" 
Consolidation Coal Co. . Div. of State Lands. 886 P.2d 514, 522 (Utah 1994) (quoting Celebrity 
Club. Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Commission. 602 P.2d 689,694 (Utah 1979)). R. 046. 
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had not, the requirements of Utah R. Civ. P., Rule 60 (b) which must still be met 
have not been met by Trease. Trease claims that the purpose of Rule 60 is to 
further justice by allowing a party who has made a mistake to have his case 
decided on the merits. Appellant's Brief at 7. However, according to Miller v. 
Brocksmith. 825 P.2d 690 (Utah App. 1992), this is not an accurate statement of 
the rules. The Miller court found that: 
"the factors to be considered [in determining whether to set aside a 
default judgment] include whether [Trease's] failure constitutes 
excusable neglect and whether [Trease] has present a meritorious 
defense to the action. ... the question of a meritorious defense arises 
only if excusable neglect has been shown." 
(Citations Omitted, emphasis added), id . at 693. State By & Through Dept. of Soc. 
Serv. v. Musselman. 667 P.2d 1053. 1056 (Utah 1983) 
Trease has not demonstrated excusable neglect and therefore whether or not 
he has a meritorious defense is not an issue. Further, his claim that it is an 
injustice that he must pay penalties if his Motion to Set Aside is denied is not an 
issue. In the Miller case a mother lost custody of her child based upon a default 
judgment. The mother claimed that she had contacted an attorney, relied upon his 
assurances that her rights were being protected and claimed that her reliance 
constituted excusable neglect. However, as in the case at hand, the only evidence 
to support the defaulted parties' claim was the defaulted parties' own hearsay 
testimony. Trease claims that he believed that scheduling a meeting wi th Moore 
tolled the deadline on answering the order. However, there is no evidence to 
support this claim, the meeting was not held before the answer was due, and 
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Moore has sworn that Trease did not discuss a response to the Notice and Order at 
the meeting. R. 0 4 1 . As in the Miller case, "[h]aving found no excusable neglect, 
it is not necessary to determine whether [Trease] had a meritorious defense to [the 
notice and order] / ' Miller at 694. See also State By & Through Dept. of Soc. Serv. 
v. Musselman. 667 P.2d 1053, 1056 (Utah 1983). 
IV. THE NOTICE AND ORDER PROVIDED TREASE WITH UNAMBIGUOUS 
NOTIFICATION OF THE FACT THAT THE ORDER WOULD BECOME FINAL IF 
HE DID NOT RESPOND. 
The Notice and Order is unmistakable. It sets forth factual findings of sixty-
nine (69) incidents of unlawful activities committed by Dan Trease and orders him 
to pay the resulting statutory penalty of $29,500 for fifty-nine (59) of those 
illegalities. R.005-003. The clear and explicit language of the Order informed 
Trease that, "[p]ursuant to § 19-6-404(3), you may contest this Notice of Violation 
and Order ... ." R.003. In addition to the Notice and Order, there was an 
accompanying letter informing Trease that "[i]f you have any questions regarding 
this matter, please contact William Moore at (801) 5 3 6 - 4 1 2 1 . " R.006. 
Trease claims his procedural due process rights were violated because of an 
alleged contradiction of instructions between the section of the Notice and Order 
notifying him of his statutory right to challenge the Order and the accompanying 
letter informing him that all questions should be referred to Mr. Moore. Appellant's 
Brief at 10, 1 1 . The "contradict ion" which Trease asserts presumably means that 
the language of the Order and its accompanying letter were vague. "Vagueness 
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questions are essentially procedural due process issues, i.e., whether the statute 
adequately notices the proscribed conduct." See e.g. State v. Hall. 905 P.2d 899, 
901 (Utah App. 1995) (quoting State v. Frampton. 737 P.2d 183, 191-92 (Utah 
1987)). However, "a statute is not unconstitutionally vague if it is sufficiently 
explicit to inform the ordinary reader what conduct is prohibited." J i . (quoting 
State v. Theobald. 645 P.2d 50, 51 (Utah 1982)). Although statutory language is 
not involved in this matter, those constitutional principles are equally applicable to 
this issue and, accordingly, no vagueness exists from the Notice and Order or its 
accompanying letter. 
The Notice and Order details which of Trease's activities were found to be 
illegal (Findings of Fact, R.005), which particular sections of Utah law found those 
activities to be improper (Violations, R.004), and the total amount of fines which he 
is ordered to pay (Order, R.003). Thus, the Notice and Order explicitly and 
sufficiently informed Trease of what conduct was prohibited and the resulting 
consequences. See, State v. Frampton. 737 P.2d 183, 191-92 (Utah 1987) ("In 
State v. Theobald, we held that '[a] statute is not unconstitutionally vague if it is 
sufficiently explicit to inform the ordinary reader what conduct is prohibited.'") 
(citations omitted). This is true whether the reader of the Notice and Order is a 
layman or a lawyer. 
Trease misstates the intent of the letter accompanying the Notice and Order 
calling it a "letter of instructions." Appellants' Brief, p. 10 -11 . The letter does not 
directly or indirectly " instruct" Trease. The letter simply informs Trease that a 
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Notice and Order has been issued against him and if he has questions he may call 
William Moore. R. 149. Similarly, the Order section of the Notice and Order simply 
notifies Trease of his right under Utah law to challenge the Order. There are no 
contradictory or confusing "instructions" in the Order and the accompanying letter, 
but simply unmistakable information concerning Trease's rights. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent has not met the burden of proving that the Secretary or the 
Board abused their discretion. A decision that constitutes "abuse of discretion" is 
one that is "arbitrary, capricious, or not based on adequate findings of fact or on 
the law." Pacer Sport and Cvcle. Inc. v. Myers, 534 P.2d 616, 617 (Utah 1 975). 
The Utah Supreme Court has further defined "abuse of discretion" as a decision 
that "exceeds the limits of reasonability. " See Neztsosie v. Meyer, 883 P.2d 920, 
922 (Utah 1994), Crossland Sav. v. Hatch. 877 P.2d 1 2 4 1 , 1243 (Utah 1994), 
State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993). 
Despite all of his protestations to the contrary, the only reason for Trease's 
failure to answer the Notice and Order is his own negligence. In accordance wi th 
the applicable rules, of which Trease was on notice, his failure to answer within the 
mandated deadline led to an automatic default. The Executive Secretary's denial of 
Respondent's Motion to Set Aside and the Board's decision to uphold that Order is 
well founded, based upon the evidence, facts and circumstance of the case, and 
well documented. The denial is well within the "limits of reasonability." In fact, it 
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is the most reasonable decision which could be reached. 
Respectfully Submitted this p\ day of March, 1997 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
I; M. HObb^ll 
Assistant Attorney General 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, two true 
and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee this p( J day of March, 
1997, to the fol lowing: 
Heinz J. Mahler 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN 
10 Exchange Place 
Fourth Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT. 84111 
22 
Addenda 
Addendum A 
R311-208-6 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 
(C) The history of compliance or noncompliance; 
and 
CD) Other unique factors. 
(3) Environmental sensitivity. The actual impact 
of the violation^) that occurred. 
(4) The number of days of noncompliance. 
(5) Inability to pay. The final computed penalty 
may be adjusted based on a person's inability to pay. 
This should be distinguished from a persons unwill-
ingness to pay. In cases of financial hardship, the 
Executive Secretary may accept payment of the 
penalty under an installment plan, delayed payment 
schedule, in-kind mitigation activity or reduced pen-
alty. 
(6) Response and investigation costs incurred by 
the State and others. 
(7) The possible deterrent effect of a penalty to 
prevent future violations. 
(b) All cases involving major violations with actual 
or high-potential for harming public health or the 
environment, and all cases involving a history of 
repeat violations by the same violator will require a 
penalty as a part of any settlement, unless good 
cause is shown for not lenlring a penalty. 
RS11-908-& Penalty Classification. 
(a) Where the Executive Secretary determines 
that a penalty is appropriate, the penalty will be 
based on the following categories and ranges consis-
tent with "EPA Penalty Guidance for Violations of 
UST Regulations" (OSWER Directive 9610.12): 
(1) Major Violations: $5,000 to $10,000 per viola-
tion. This category includes: 
(A) Deviation from the requirements of the rules 
or Act to such an extent that there is substantial 
noncompliance; 
(B) A violation that causes or may cause substan-
tial or continuing risk to human health and the 
environment; or 
(C) A violation that may have a substantial ad-
verse effect on the regulatory program. 
(2) Moderate Violations: $2,000 to $7,000 per 
violation. This category includes: 
(A) Deviation from tic requirements of the rules 
or Act but to some extent the requirements have 
been implemented as intended; 
(B) A violation that causes or may cause a signifi-
cant risk to human health and the environment; or 
(C) A violation that may have a significant adverse 
effect on the regulatory program. 
(3) Minor Violations: Up to $3,000 per violation. 
This category includes: 
(A) Slight deviation from the rules or Act but most 
of the requirements are met; 
(B) A violation that causes or may cause a rela-
tively low risk to human health and the environ-
ment; or 
(C) A violation that may have a minor adverse 
effect on the regulatory program. 
(b) The Executive Secretary shall have the discre-
tion to determine the appropriate penalty within 
these ranges. In setting the amount of the penalty, 
the Executive Secretary will consider the factors 
listed in Section R3U-208-5. 
1992 19-6-106,19-6 
RS11-209. State Cleanup Appropriation* 
R311-20S-1. Definitions. 
R311-209-2. Use of the State Cleanup Appropriation. 
R3U-20S-3. Criteria lor Allocating State Cleanup Appro-
priation*. 
RSU-909-1. Definitions* 
Definitions are found in Section R311-200. 
R81M09-2. Use of the State Cleanup Appro-
priation. 
The Executive Secretary shall authorise action or 
expenditure of money from the State Cleanup Ap-
propriation, as authorised by Subsection 19-6-
409(5), when: 
(a) The release is from a regulated UST, 
(b) The owner or operator is not covered by the 
Petroleum Storage Tank Fund, 
(c) The release is a direct or potential threat to 
human health or the environment, and 
(d) The owner or operator is unknown, unable, or 
unwilling to bring the site under control or 
remediate the site to achieve the clean-up goals as 
described in Section R3U-2U, or 
(e) Other relevant factors are evident as deter-
mined by the Executive Secretary. 
R8U-909-3. Criteria for Allocating State 
Cleanup Appropriations. 
When determining priorities for authorizing ac-
tion or expenditures from the Petroleum Storage 
Tank Fund surplus, the Executive Secretary shall 
give due emphasis to releases that present a threat 
to the public health or the environment on a case-by 
ease basis using the following criteria: 
(a) The immediate or direct threat to public health 
or the environment, 
(b) The potential threat to public health or the 
environment, 
(c) The economic consideration and cost effective-
ness of the action, and 
(d) The technology available, or 
(e) Other relevant fiactors as determined by the 
Executive Secretary. 
1994 19-6-106,19-6-409 
R311-210. Administrative Procedures for 
Underground Storage Tank Act Adjudi-
cative Proceedings. 
R3U-210-1. Definition!. 
RS11-210-2. General Provisions. 
8311-210^ 3. Orders, NOVs, and Other Decisions by the 
Kienitits Secret aj >. 
R311-210-4. Cantestinf the Validity of Initial Orders and 
Notices of Violation Issued by the Executive Secretary. 
BS11-210-6. Parties and Intervention. 
R3U-210-6. Presiduaf Officer or Other Adjudicator. 
B3U-210-7. Dasignstion of Formal Proceedingi. 
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R311-21M. Cosranfee i/rmwiilirni 
B811-210-9 Preiau&sjy Mattan to A|i|i«H«Bnf and 
Other Proossdinfs. 
R311-210-10. Muhipk Icsoss er Perbae. 
1311-210-U. Ifotions. 
R8U-210-12. Rseard ft»w-i-r~ ad Rsvisw. 
BS12-210-18. Diseovsry. 
13X1.210-14. P»-Hasru«Mstttrs. 
E311.210-I5. Conduct of Formal Hssriags. 
E311-21G-16. Roles of Evidence. 
R811-210.17. Bernm mended Ordsrs. 
1311-210.10. Stsysef Ordsrs. 
E3U-210-L Definition* 
Dsflnitians art found m Section R311-200. 
BSU-SIO-S. General Provisions 
(a) In accordance with the Utah Administrative 
Ptooeduree Act (UAPA), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
at amended, Section 63-46b-l at ocq., thaaa rulet act 
ferth prooeduret which govern ijqdtial ordan and 
notices of Tiolation by tht Executive Secretary. Such 
initial orders and notioaa of violation era not gov-
erned by tht UAPA at provided in Subsection 63-
46b-l(2Xk). Heat rulet alec govern adjudicative 
prooaedingi before the Board, eoneomiag agency 
action* directed or addraaaad by tht Underground 
Storage Tank Act. 
(b) Recognizing tht potential far an ever incraee-
ing burden from adjudicating a natter, theet rulet 
an to facilitate and encourage that dieputae bt 
raeolved at tht loweet level poeeible. 
(c) Theet rulet art not intended to bt oomprahen-
aive, but, art far supplementation^ and provide far 
tht inherent needt and unique pmrposat of prooocd-
inga directed or addreaaed by the Underground 
Storage Tank Act. 
(d) Theet rulet ahall be Kbenilly eonetrued to 
eecura a just, apeedy and economical determination 
of all iaeuet prat anted. Theet rulet ahall alao bt 
oonftrued to bt in eomphanet witii the UAPA at far 
at tht UAPA it applicable, tht Environmental Qual-
ity Codt (Section 19-1 et eeq.) and the Underground 
Storage Tknk Act Whenever indicated, certain pro-
vision! have exclusive application to either UAPA 
exempt, formal, or informal prooeedinga. 
(e) Individuals who art partidpantt to e proceed-
ing, en agency which it a participant to a proceed-
ing, or an individual designated by e partnership, 
corporation, association or governmental oubdivi-
eicm may represent their interest in tht pinrsoiling. 
Any participant may be represented by an attorney 
licensed to practice in tht State of 'Utah or attorneys 
licensed to practice law in another jurisdiction 
which meet tht rules of the Utah State Bar far 
practicing law before tht courts of the 8tate of Utah. 
(f) Whenever a party is known to bt rspreesnted 
by en ettomey, any iasuanes of an order or notiot of 
violation, or service required or permitted by theet 
rulet or UAPA shall bt made upon tht attorney 
instead of upon tht party itsslt ]En matters where 
tht Executive Secretary is a participant, eervict 
shell be made to tht Executive Secretary and attor-
&oy repreeenting tht Executive Sserstary. 
L A perty ia known to be repreatnted by en 
attorney et the time the attorney filet s notice of 
appoaranot of counsel, rsquest for egency action, or 
any other paper which the attorney eigne on behalf 
of a party. 
2. Issuance of an order or notiot of violation to an 
attorney or nnropiooontori perty shall bt made by 
certified mail to the attorney or party*! most current 
address listed on papers filed by tht attorney or 
unreproccDtod party. If delivery of certified mail is 
refused, the ieeued order or notice shall than bt sent 
by regular mailing. 
S. Other eervict upon en attorney or unrepre-
sented pasty ahall be made by mailing tht docu-
aaontt to the attorney or party's most current ad-
toss, at listed on papers filed by the attorney or 
perty. If no eddreai is known, tht donrmsntt shall 
bt left with tht presiding officer. In requests for 
agency action, the presiding officer may require 
adrfttifinal efforts in determining e current address, 
or publication. 
(g) Psrtiet that request e determination of reepon-
ofblt parties or apportioning of liability among re-
sponsible perties shell pey the eostt erf the initial 
notion, and any proceedings following s contest of en 
initial action at a rate ast by tht state legislsture. 
Bowsver, when e final determination of liability is 
mads and tht requesting perty is lest than ant 
hundred per cent habit, tht costs of tht proceedings 
ahall bt included in the apportionment decision end 
the requesting perty mey rsoover its costs from tht 
ether partiet aooording to each party's apportioned 
liability. If tht agency mitistst such proceedings 
without s requesting perty, the egency shell pey tht 
eostt of the proceedings end may recover eoctt of tht 
proceedings as provided abovs. 
(h) Except as otharwies stated m Section R311-
S10, informal adjudicative proceedings shall bt con-
ducted in eocordanet with Section 6&46b-5. 
6) A contested initial order involving the revoca-
tion of certificates of i*wwtPtiffTK^ is, in aeoordanot 
with Bubeection l»-$-4H(8), before tht Executive 
Director. In such contested orders the term 'Board* 
as used in R311-210 means the Executive Director. 
(j) The tenn •issue* es in issuing an order means 
the time e signed order is mailed by certified maiL 
(k) TSme shall bt computed at provided in Bule 6 
ef the Utah Rulet of Civil Procedure. 
0) At the time theee rules become effective, they 
will apply to ongoing adjudicative proceedings. 
B3U-I10-*. Order*, NOVs, and Other Dad-
otons by the Executive Secretary. 
(a) Proceedings that culminate in the issuanot of 
u UtisJ order or e notiot of violation art not 
governed by tht provisions of ths UAPA at specified 
in Bubeection 88-48b-l(2Xk). 
<b) The initial ordan and notices descrihsd in ths 
m t ^ | subsection (a) ahall be ieeued by the 
Executive Secretary. 
(c) Orders and notioss of violation may be ieeued 
by ths Executive Secretary after investigation of the 
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matter which may at the Executive Secretary's dis-
cretion include only review of the agency file. 
(d) All initial orders or notices of violation are 
effective upon issuance and shall become final if not 
contested within 30 days after the date issued 
Failure to timely contest an initial order or notice of 
violation waives any right of administrative contest, 
reconsideration, review or judicial appeal The con-
testing party has the burden of proving that an 
investigative order or notice of violation was con-
tested within 30 days of its issuance. 
(e) A party may seek to have the Executive Secre-
tary set aside an initial order or notice of violation 
which was not contested within 30 days and became 
final by following the procedures outlined in the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for setting aside 
default judgments. 
1. Amotion to set aside an initial order or notice of 
violation that became final shall be made to the 
Executive Secretary. 
2. If a motion to set aside an initial order or notice 
of violation that became final is denied, the party 
may seek reconsideration or agency review of only 
that decision to deny such motion to set aside the 
order or notice. 
3. In proceedings involving multiple parties, a 
party that has an initial order issued against it 
which becomes final, is precluded from participating 
in any further adjudicative proceedings with the 
other parties on the matter. 
(f) All initial orders and notices of violation issued 
by the Executive Secretary shall be listed in a log 
that is available for public inspection during office 
hours. 
R311-210-4. Contesting the Validity of Initial 
Orders and Notices of Violation Issued by 
the Executive Secretary. 
(a) The validity of initial orders or notices of 
violation may be contested by filing a request for 
agency action, as specified in Section 63-46b-3 of the 
UAPA, with the Board: Solid and Hazardous Waste 
Control Board; Division of Environmental Response 
and Remediation; 168 North 1950 West, 1st Floor, 
PO Box 144840; Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-4840; or 
when contesting an initial order revoking a certifi-
cate of compliance, by filing such request with the 
Executive Director of the Department of Environ-
mental Quality: Department of Environmental 
Quality, Office of the Executive Director, 168 North 
1950 West, 2nd Floor; PO Box 144810; Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84114-4810. 
(b) Any such request must be received for filing 
within thirty (30) days of the date the Executive 
Secretary issues the order or notice of violation. 
(c) A request for agency action and all subsequent 
proceedings acting on that request are governed by 
the UAPA as provided in Subsection 63-46b-l(2Xk). 
(d) Notice of the time and place of any scheduled 
hearing shall be provided in the response to a 
request for agency action. If a hearing has not been 
scheduled, the response shall give notice of the time 
and place of a pre-hearing conference to appropri-
ately schedule a hearing. Notice of the time and 
place of a hearing shall be provided promptly after 
the hearing is scheduled. 
R311-210-5. Parties and Intervention* 
(a) The following persons are parties to a proceed-
ing governed by this rule: 
1. The person or persons to whom the challenged 
order or notice of violation is directed; 
2. The Executive Secretary; and 
3. All persons whose legal rights or interests are 
substantially affected by the proceeding, and to 
whom intervention rights have been granted under 
R311-210-5(d). 
(b) In a proceeding requested by the person to 
whom the challenged order or notice of violation is 
directed, that person shall be the petitioner and the 
Executive Secretary or any other non-requesting 
parties shall be the respondent. 
(c) In a proceeding requested by the person re-
questing intervention, the intervenor shall be the 
petitioner (provided that intervention is granted), 
and the Executive Secretary and any persons to 
whom the challenged order or notice of violation is 
directed shall be the respondents. 
(d) Intervention: A person who is not a party to a 
proceeding may request intervention under Section 
63-46b-9 of the UAPA for the purpose of filing a 
request for agency action, and may simultaneously 
file that request Any such request for intervention 
and agency action must be received by the Board for 
filing as provided in R311-210-4 within 30 days of 
the date of the pertinent order or notice of violation. 
The person seeking intervention shall provide copies 
of the request and any accompanying motions, no-
tices, and requests to all parties. 
(e) Any party may, within 20 days or such earlier 
time as established by the presiding officer, respond 
to a request for intervention. If no presiding officer 
with a general appointment exists, the Chair of the 
Board may act as presiding officer for purposes of 
this paragraph. 
(f) Persons may be permitted by the presiding 
officer to enter an appearance as Amicus Curiae, 
subject to conditions established by the presiding 
officer. 
R311-210-6. Presiding Officer or Other Adjudi-
cator. 
(a) The Board is the 'agency head" as the term is 
used in the UAPA. The Board is also the "presiding 
officer,* as that term is used in the UAPA, except: 
1. the Chair of the Board shall be considered the 
presiding officer to the extent that these rules allow; 
and 
2. the Board may by order appoint a presiding 
officer to preside over all or a portion of the proceed-
ings. 
(b) A presiding officer appointed by the Board shall 
be empowered with such authority as granted by the 
Board and the UAPA, except making final substan-
tive decisions and as may be limited by Section 
R311-210 or the appointing authority. 
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RS11-210-7. Designation of Formal Proceed-
ings. 
Proceedings pursuant to a request for agency 
action before the Board are designated as formal, 
including: proceedings to determine responsible par-
ties and apportion liability among responsible par-
ties, enforcement, violations, non-compliance, civil 
penalties, assessments, revocations, lapsed or termi-
nated certificates, abatements, corrective plans, re-
leases, tank tightness, claims, and other matters 
determining a person's legal interest. 
R31I-210-8. Conversion of Proceedings. 
(a) The Board, or in accordance with the UAPA, 
the presiding officer, may, at any time, convert 
proceedings which are designated informal to for-
mal, and proceedings which are designated as for-
mal to informal if conversion is in the public interest 
and rights of all parties are not unfairly prejudiced. 
(b) If multiple issues are part of one proceeding, 
the presiding officer may separate the proceedings to 
convert one or more of the matters from formal to 
informal or informal to formal while allowing the 
other matters to proceed at the ongoing designation. 
R311-210-9. Preliminary Matters to Apportion-
ment and Other Proceedings. 
(a) The Executive Secretary may request owners 
or operators of a facility that had a release of a 
regulated substance or any persons identified as 
potential responsible parties to provide information 
and documentation pertinent to the identincation of 
other responsible parties. However, this does not 
prevent the Executive Secretary from determining 
responsible parties and apportioning liability. If in-
formation identifying or otherwise concerning other 
potentially responsible parties is provided, the for-
warding of such information to the Executive Secre-
tary is not to be construed as a request to determine 
responsible parties or apportion liability. 
(b) The Executive Secretary may mai:e a prelimi-
nary identification of as many responsible parties as 
reasonably possible that are to be a part of an initial 
proceeding. The preliminary identification of re-
sponsible parties does not constitute an initial order 
or notice of violation. The preliminary identification 
may be made solely from information provided in 
the manner described in subsection R311-210-9(a). 
In making such a determination, the Executive 
Secretary may assess whether any identification of a 
responsible party by other parties is without merit, 
or may find that no grounds exist to identify such 
person as a responsible party. 
(c) Before any initial proceeding is commenced, 
the Executive Secretary, or a representative of the 
Executive Secretary may seek to resolve the im-
pending proceeding by encouraging en- facilitating 
settlement. 
R311-210-10. Multiple Issues or Parties. 
(a) Multiple issues may be determined in one 
proceeding, or in one resulting order or notice of 
violation. 
(b) Proceedings to determine multiple issues in 
one initial agency action may if contested, proceed 
separately, either as informal, or formal proceed-
ings. 
(c) The naming or identifying of responsible par-
ties as part of an investigation whether or not it 
results in an initial order or notice of violation, or as 
part of an abjudication does not preclude the naming 
or identifying of different or additional responsible 
parties in the same investigation or adjudication for 
different issues, or separate investigations or adju-
dications concerning different issues. 
RS11-210-11- Motions. 
(a) In an informal proceeding, a motion or re-
sponse to a motion may be submitted orally or in 
writing as directed by the presiding officer. 
(b) In a formal proceeding, any motion or response 
to a motion shall be submitted in writing to the 
presiding officer, unless otherwise directed by the 
presiding officer. The motion or response may be 
accompanied by a short supporting memorandum of 
fact and law. Supporting or contravening affidavits 
may be submitted with the motion or response. 
(c) Responses to motions must be received by the 
presiding officer ten days after the motion is submit-
ted, unless otherwise directed by the presiding offi-
cer. 
(d) Although the agency or parties may file re-
sponses as provided in R311-210-ll(c), such re-
sponses are not required and the agency or parties 
will not be subject to default for declining to file 
responses. 
(e) Dispositive motions that concern facts or mat-
ters beyond those contained solely within the re-
quest for agency action shall be completed 30 days 
before the scheduled hearing, unless otherwise di-
rected by the presiding officer. 
R811-210-12- Record Submission and Review. 
In accordance with Subsection 63-46b-5(e), in in-
formal proceedings the presiding officer may require 
parties to submit pertinent information within a 
designated response period. Parties' access to infor-
mation shall be as provided in the UAPA. The 
presiding officer may sanction a party that does not 
submit information that is requested by the presid-
ing officer. Such sanctions include exclusion of evi-
dence at the hearing, being held in default, or other 
applicable sanctions found in Rule 37(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. If a hearing is scheduled, a 
party shall submit to the presiding officer any infor-
mation that was not requested that the party in-
tends to use at the hearing 30 days before the 
hearing. Failure to timely submit such information 
may result in the presiding officer excluding the 
information at the hearing. 
RS11-210-1S. Disoovery. 
(a) In formal proceedings, all parties shall submit 
to the presiding officer all relevant information they 
possess or are aware of necessary for parties to 
support their claims or defenses within 30 days after 
proceedings are commenced, and with newly ac-
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quired information within 30 days after the party 
discovers such information, but not less than 30 
days before a formal hearing. The Executive Secre-
tary satisfies this obligation by maVrng the public 
agency file available for inspection. If a party foils to 
timely provide the required information, the presid-
ing officer may enter an order of default, exclude 
evidence, or enter other applicable sanctions found 
in Rule 37(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Parties submitting the information shall provide 
notice to all other parties with a list or brief sum-
mary of all information being submitted. Parties 
shall have access to the information submitted to 
the presiding officer, and to information acquired 
through agency investigations and other informa-
tion contained in its files. 
(b) In formal proceedings the presiding officer may 
vary the manner of discovery if it appears appropri-
ate, or upon the motion of a party and for good cause 
shown. If discovery is varied to be more in accor-
dance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, copies 
of all discovery conducted between parties shall be 
provided to the presiding officer at the cost to the 
party seeking discovery. 
(c) In formal proceedings, upon approval by the 
presiding officer, any party may serve on any other 
party a request to permit entry upon designated 
land or other property in the possession or control of 
the party upon whom the request is served for the 
purpose of inspection and measuring, surveying, 
photographing, testing, or sampling the property or 
any designated object or operation thereon if the 
information sought is reasonably calculated to lead 
to the discovery of admissible evidence. 
1. The request shall set forth the items to be 
inspected either by individual item or by category, 
and describe each item and category with reason-
able particularity. The request shall specify a rea-
sonable time, place, and manner of making the 
inspection and performing the related acts. 
2. The party upon whom the request is served 
shall serve a written response within 20 days after 
the service of the request. The presiding officer may 
allow a shorter or longer time. The response shall 
state with respect to each item or category, that 
inspection and related activities will be permitted as 
requested, unless the request is objected to, in which 
event the reasons for objection shall be stated. The 
party submitting the request may move for an order 
compelling inspection and seek any sanction re-
ferred to above in subsection (a) with respect to any 
objection to or failure to respond to the request or 
any part thereof, or any failure to permit inspection 
as requested. 
R311-210-14. Pre-Hearing Matters. 
(a) In proceedings in which a hearing may be held, 
the presiding officer may, upon written notice to all 
parties of record, hold a pre-hearing conference. 
Matters that may be discussed at the pre-hearing 
conference include: setting a hearing date; formulat-
ing or simplifying the issues; obtaining stipulations, 
admissions of fact and of documents which will avoid 
unnecessary proof; arranging for the exchange of 
proposed exhibits or prepared expert testimony; 
identifying all other proposed exhibits or witnesses; 
outlining or reviewing procedures to be followed; 
encouraging joint pleadings, exhibits, testimony and 
cross-examination where parties have common in-
terests; and facilitating settlement and other agree-
ments. Any other matters that may expedite the 
orderly conduct of the proceedings may be discussed. 
(b) Parties to a proceeding are encouraged to 
prepare a joint proposed schedule addressing mat-
ters such as a hearing date, and motion and discov-
ery cut off dates. If the parties cannot agree on a 
joint proposed schedule, the presiding officer may 
consider proposals by any party. 
(c) The presiding officer shall establish schedules 
for discovery and other pre-hearing proceedings, for 
the heaxing, and for any post-hearing proceedings. 
R311-210-15. Conduct of Formal Hearings. 
(a) All formal hearings shall be open to the public, 
unless otherwise ordered by the presiding officer for 
good cause shown. 
(b) The presiding officer shall maintain order and 
may, recess the hearing for the time necessary to 
regain order if a person engages in disrespectful, 
disorderly, or contumacious conduct. The presiding 
officer may take measures to remove a person, 
including participants from the hearing, if neces-
sary, to maintain order. If a participant shows per-
sistent disregard on matters of order and procedure, 
the presiding officer may enter a sanction on the 
person including: restricting the person's participa-
tion, putting on evidence, or issuing an order of 
default. 
(c) If a party desires to employ a court reporter to 
make a record of the hearing, the original transcript 
of the hearing shall be filed with the presiding officer 
at no cost to the agency. 
(d) In apportionment proceedings, the order of 
presentation of evidence will be as follows, unless 
otherwise directed by the presiding officer the re-
sponsible party most recently involved in the facility, 
with operators having priority over owners; then 
underground storage tank installation companies, 
then subsequent responsible parties in the order of 
recency of involvement in the facility; intervenor(s); 
the agency, and other interested parties. Argument 
normally will follow the same order. For other pro-
ceedings, the presiding officer may order the presen-
tation of evidence in a manner deemed appropriate. 
(e) Parties may question opposing witnesses on 
any matter relevant to the issue even though the 
matter was not covered in direct examination. The 
presiding officer may limit or exclude friendly cross-
examination. The presiding officer shall discourage 
and may prohibit parties from making their case 
through cross-examination. 
(f) The presiding officer may question any party or 
witness and may admit any evidence believed rel-
evant or material. 
(g) The presiding officer may continue a hearing to 
another time or place if additional evidence is avail-
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able or reasonably expected to be available and the 
presiding officer determines such evidence is neces-
sary for the proper determination of the case. 
R311-210-16. Rule* of Evidence. 
(a) The presiding officer is not bound by the rules 
of evidence and need not adhere to the rules as 
required in civil actions in the courts of this State. 
Nevertheless, in proceedings contesting an initial 
order or notice of violation, the Utah Rules of Evi-
dence shall be used as an appropriate guide insofar 
as they are not inconsistent with the UAPA and 
these Rules. 
(b) In contested proceedings providing a hearing, 
if a witness' testimony has been reduced to writing 
and filed with the presiding officer at least 30 days 
prior to the hearing, the testimony may be placed 
into the record as an exhibit. Parties shall have an 
opportunity to cross-examine the witness on the 
testimony. 
R311-210-17. Recommended Orders. 
(a) If the presiding officer in a proceeding is an 
appointed presiding officer, at the conclusion of the 
hearing or taking evidence, the presiding officer 
cannot make any final substantive decisions, but, 
shall take the matter under advisement and shall 
submit to the Board recommended orders. The rec-
ommended orders shall follow the form in the UAPA 
for signed and issued orders in informal or formal 
proceedings. All recommended orders will be public 
record and copies shall be distributed to all parties. 
(b) Any party may, within 20 days of the date the 
draft order is mailed, delivered, or published, com-
ment on the draft order. 
(c) The Board may adopt and sign the recom-
mended orders or any portion of them as final 
orders; reject the recommended orders or any por-
tion of them and make an independent determina-
tion based on the record or order further proceed-
ings. If the Board adopts or rejects a portion of the 
recommended orders, the Board shall make specific 
reference to the portion adopted or rejected. If the 
Board rejects the entire recommended orders, the 
Board shall specifically state that they are rejected 
in their entirety. The Board shall cite specifically to 
the record for the bases of any independent deter-
minations in the final orders. 
(d) The Board may remand the matter to the 
presiding officer to take additional evidence. The 
presiding officer thereafter shall submit to the Board 
new recommended orders. 
(e) The Board adopting and signing recommended 
orders as final orders or making independent deter-
minations and signing them as final orders pursuant 
to a request for agency action to contest an initial 
order does not constitute agency review, but is open 
to a request for reconsideration in accordance with 
Section 63-46b-13 of the UAPA. 
R311-210-1& Stays of Orders. 
(a) Orders of the Executive Secretary are immedi-
ately effective upon being issued. Upon a timely 
request for agency action to contest such orders, any 
person who desires a stay of the order before the 
next regular board meeting may request a stay. 
(b) A party seeking a stay of the order of the 
Executive Secretary shall file a motion with the 
presiding officer. 
(c) The presiding officer may order a stay of the 
order of the Executive Secretary if the party seeking 
the stay demonstrates that: 
1. The party seeking the stay will suffer irrepa-
rable harm unless the stay issues; 
2. The threatened injury to the party seeking the 
stay outweighs whatever damage the proposed stay 
is likely to cause the party restrained or enjoined; 
3. The stay, if issued, would not be adverse to the 
public interest; and 
4. There is a substantial likelihood that the party 
enrlrirtg the stay will prevail on the merits of the 
underlying claim, or the case presents serious issues 
on the merits which should be the subject of further 
evaluation by the presiding officer. 
(d) No bond shall be required from the party 
requesting the stay. 
(e) The Board may grant a stay of its order (or of 
the order of its appointed presiding officer) during 
the pendency of judicial review if the standards of 
R311-210-18(c) are met. 
(f) The request for a stay shall be deemed denied 
if the presiding officer does not issue a written 
decision to deny or grant a stay of any order within 
ten working days of the filing of a written motion. 
1994 194-105, 19-6-408 
R311-211. Corrective Action Clean-up 
Standards Policy — UST and CERCLA 
Sites. 
R311-21M. Definitions. 
R311-211-2. Source Elimination. 
K311-211-3. Clean-up Standards Evaluation Criteria. 
R311-2U-4. Prevention of Further Degradation. 
R311-211-5. Clean-up Standards. 
R311-211-6. Significance Level. 
R311-211-7. Interim Policy. 
R311-211-1. Definitions. 
Definitions are found in Section R311-200. 
R311-211-2. Source Elimination, 
The initial step in all corrective actions imple-
mented at UST and CERCLA sites is to take appro-
priate action to eliminate the source of contamina-
tion either through removal, or appropriate aource 
control. 
R311-211-S. Clean-up Standards Evaluation 
Criteria. 
Subsequent to aource elimination, clean-up stan-
dards for remaining contamination which may in-
clude numerical, technology-based or risk-based 
standards or any combination of those standards, 
shall be determined on a case-by-case basis, taking 
into consideration the following criteria: 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 58 Am. Jur. 2d New Trial Amendment, after expiration of time for fil-
f{ 11 to 14, 29 et teq., 187 to 191. ing motion for new trial, in dvil case, of motion 
C.J.S. — 66 C J.S. New Trial i§ 13 et seq., made in due time, 69 A.L.ItSd 845. 
116/116, 122 to 127. Authority of atate court to order jury trial in 
AJLR. — Content aa ground of vacating civil caee where jury hae been waived or not 
judgment, or granting new trial, in civil caee, ii>m«n^ by parties, 9 AXIUth 1041. 
after expiration of term or time prescribed by Deafness of juror as ground for impflnrhing 
statute or rules of court, 3 AXJELSd 1191. verdict, or em in \ng new trial or reversal on 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of suggestion appeal, 38 AJLR.4th 1170. 
or comments by judge as to compromise or set- Jury trial waiver as binding on later state 
tlement of civil case, 6 AJLRSd 1467.
 d v i j trisli ^ AXIUth 747. 
Necessity and propriety of counter-affidavits ^ ^
 rWgmto>% death or disability prior to 
in opposition tojBJ°ti<m for new trial in civil transcribing notes as grounds for reversal or 
case, 7 AXJtSd 1000. new trial, 67 AXJL4th 1049. 
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ises in question, 11 AiJLSd 918. damages for personal injury to or death of sea-
Propriety and injudicial effect of r^eronce **an ** actions under Jones Act (46 USCS 
by counsel in civil case to result of former trial Appx.l 688) or doctrine of unseaworthiness — 
of same case, or amount of verdict therein, 16 modern cases, 96 AX.R. Fed. 641. 
AXJt3d 1101. Excessiveness or adequacy of awards of dam-
Absence of judge from courtroom during trial •£©* for personal injury or death in actions un-
of civil case, 26 A.LJt3d 637. der Federal Employers' Liability Act (46 USCS 
Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of f ( 61 et seq.) — modern cases, 97 A.LH. Fed. 
acquaintance or relationship with attorney in 189. 
case, or with partner or associate of such attor- Key Numbers. — New Trial •» 13 et seq., 
nay, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64 no, 116. 
AJLIUd 126. 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other 
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may 
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of 
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pen-
dency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is 
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending 
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evi-
dence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a 
new trial under Rule 59(b); (8) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrin-
sic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; 
<4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally 
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has 
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has 
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A 
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to enter-
tain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or pro-
ceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
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obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these 
rules or by an independent action. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule if similar to 
Rule 60, F.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
"Any other reason justifying relief." 
—Default judgment. 
—Impossibility of compliance with order. 
—Incompetent counsel. 
—Lack of due process. 
—Merits of case. 
—Mistake or inadvertence. 
—Mutual mistake. 
—Real party in interest. 
—Refund of fine after riismisssl. 
Appeals. 
Clerical mistakes. 
—Computation of damages. 
—Correction after appeal. 
—Date of judgment. 
-—Void judgment. 
—Estate record. 
—Inherent power of courts. 
—Intent of court and parties. 
—Judicial error distinguished. 
—Order prepared by counsel. 
—Predating of new trial motion. 
Court's discretion. 
Default judgment. 
Effect of set-aside judgment. 
—Admissions. 
Form of motion. 
Fraud. 
—Burden of proof. 
—Divorce action. 
Independent action. 
—Constitutionality of taxes. 
—Divorce decree. 
—Fraud or duress. 
—Motion distinguished. 
Invalid summons. 
—Amendment without notice. 
Inequity of prospective application. 
Jurisdiction. 
Mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable 
neglect. 
—Default judgment 
Illness. 
Inconvenience. 
Meritorious. 
—Meri t s of claim. 
-—Negligence of attorney. 
No claim for relief. 
-—Delayed motion for new trial. 
—Factual error. 
—Failure to file cost bill. 
—Failure to file notice of appeal. 
—Nonreceipt of notice and findings. 
—Trial court's discretion. 
—Unemployment compensation appeal. 
—Workmen's compensation appeal. 
Newly discovered evidence. 
—Burden of proof. 
—Discretion not abused. 
Procedure. 
—Notice to parties. 
Res judicata. 
Reversal of judgment. 
—Invalidation of sale. 
Satisfaction, release or discharge. 
—Accord and satisfaction. 
—Discharging representative of estate from 
farther demand. 
—Erroneously included damages. 
—Prospective application of judgment. 
Timeliness of motion. 
—Confused mental condition of party. 
—Dismissal for lack of prosecution. 
—Fraud. 
—Invalid service. 
—Judicial error. 
—Jurisdiction. 
—Mistake, inadvertence and neglect. 
—Newly discovered evidence. 
—Order entered upon erroneous assumption. 
—•Reasonable time." 
—Reconsideration of previously denied motion. 
—Satisfaction. 
Unauthorized appearance. 
Void judgment. 
—Basis. 
—Lack of jurisdiction. 
Cited. 
"Any other reason justifying relief." 
Subdivision (7) embodies three require-
ments: First, that the reason be one other than 
those listed in Subdivisions (1) through (6); sec-
ond, that the reason justify relief; and third, 
that the motion be made within a reasonable 
time. Laub v. South Cent. Utah Tel. AaVn, 657 
P.2d 1804 (Utah 1982); Richins v. Delbert 
Chipman & Sons, 817 P.2d 882 (Utah Ct App. 
1991). 
Where a defendant's motion to set aside 
judgment based on Subdivisions (bXD and (7) 
and his motion for a new trial claimed that 
plaintiff violated Rule 5(a) on several occasions 
by not providing defendant with a copy of 
pleadings, thereby causing surprise, centering 
on plaintiffs failure to provide a copy of his 
motion for summary judgment to defendant, 
which the latter claimed was a clear showing 
of fraud on plaintiffs part, the trial court could 
have believed in denying defendant's motion, 
that fraud was not present in what could be 
considered s lapse in procedure by plaintiffs 
counsel. Walker v. Carlson, 740 P.2d 1872 
(Utah Ct App. 1987). 
Defendant's claim that he mistakenly en-
tered into an ill-advised stipulation without 
fully understanding its consequences was cor-
rectly characterised by trial court as mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise or neglect under Subdi-
vision (b)(1); because Subdivision (bXD ap-
plied, Subdivision (b)(7) could not apply and 
could not be used to circumvent the three-
month filing period. Richins v. Delbert 
Chipman & Sons, 817 P.2d 882 (Utah Ct App. 
1991). 
